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ABSTRACT 
In 2012, the International Criminal Court (ICC) convicted Thomas Lubanga Dyilo 
for enlisting, conscripting and using child soldiers during the Ituri conflict in the 
Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC). Two and a half years later, the Appeals 
Chamber of the Court issued an amended reparations order against Lubanga. This 
paper seeks to examine whether the amended order for reparations and the draft 
implementation plan for reparations in the Lubanga case failed child soldier victims 
by only ordering collective reparations instead of individual reparations. This article 
argues that despite the near impossible task at hand, which involved the diluting of 
victims’ individual reparations requests, the ICC and TFV have come up with as 
good a reparations plan as possible, balancing individual victims’ needs and requests 
with larger, community considerations. 
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In 2012, the International Criminal Court (ICC) convicted Thomas Lubanga Dyilo for 
enlisting, conscripting and using child soldiers during the Ituri conflict in the Democratic 
Republic of Congo (DRC). In August 2012, the trial chamber issued its reparations order. Two 
and a half years later, the Appeals Chamber of the Court issued an amended reparations order 
against Lubanga. The two groups of legal representatives to the victims advocated for individual 
reparations from the start of the proceedings, and the victims’ main aim was to reintegrate into 
society through reparations such as education grants, access to employment opportunities and 
other monetary means that would facilitate reintegration. However, the Court adopted the 
Trust Fund for Victims (TFV) approach to reparations, which was based on a collective 
community-based reparations approach.  
 
The ICC, in endorsing the TFV’s approach to reparations, took a collective, community-based 
approach to reparations in the Lubanga case. However, child soldier victims in this case did not 
see themselves as a collective group1. They were typically dispersed groups and not necessarily 
                                                
* Sangeetha Yogendran LL.B. (Honours) (National University of Singapore), LL.M. in Public and International Law 
(The University of Melbourne).	
1 Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, Observations on the sentence and reparations by Victims a/0001/06, 
a/0003/06, a/0007/06, a/00049/06, a/0149/07, a/0155/07, a/0156/07, a/0162/07, a/0149/08, 
a/0404/08, a/0405/08, a/0406/08, a/0407/08, a/0409/08 , a/0523/08, a/0610/08, a/0611/08, 
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based in the communities where they were initially abducted or conscripted. Both groups of 
victims advocated for individual reparations, rejecting the Trust Fund’s community-based 
approach.  
 
This article seeks to examine whether the amended order for reparations and the draft 
implementation plan for reparations in the Lubanga case failed child soldier victims by not 
granting their individual reparations requests and only ordering collective reparations instead.  
  
This article will provide a brief background to the Lubanga case, before examining the right to 
reparations, the various reparations requests made by the parties to the case at the International 
Criminal Court (ICC or the Court), before lastly examining the draft implementation plan put 
forward by the Court. The ICC had to balance the individual reparations requests made by the 
child soldier victims with collective community interests. This article argues that despite the 
unenviable task at hand, the ICC and TFV have come up with a reasonably balanced 
reparations plan, balancing individual victims’ needs and requests with larger community 
considerations, such as the need to not further exacerbate community tensions, and reaching 
the most victims possible despite limited resources at the ICC’s disposal. However, each victim’s 
experience is different and can impact them in different ways. In determining reparations in the 
Lubanga case from a collective lens, the ICC may have failed to recognise this individuality and 
agency of child victims. This article argues that in this way, the ICC failed child soldier victims 
by sacrificing their individual needs for larger collective considerations. 
 
Given the precedent that the Lubanga reparations order and implementation plan will have, 
there is a need to recognise that if the ICC, or other international criminal tribunals, will lean 
towards collective reparations because of limited funds and resources, these processes and the 
reasoning behind the decisions taken by the Court need to be properly explained to victims. 
Court officials, lawyers and others working with victims need to constructively and exhaustively 
engage with the affected communities, and to understand and respect the varied needs of 
victims. While the international community may see the value in symbolic collective 
reparations, these reparations may not be as significant for the individual victim who is 
struggling to recover and get by. This dilemma demonstrates the uphill task of developing 
reparations programmes that can address individual as well as collective needs, without 
sacrificing one for the other.  
 
 
I. Background to the Conflict and Case 
 
The background to the conflict was provided for in the public redacted version of the Closing 
Brief of the V02 Group of Victims dated 1 June 2011.2 In the Closing Brief, the circumstances 
that led to the conflict arising were succinctly summarised. The  
inter-ethnic violence that arose in the DRC began in July 1999, and in 2002 the population of 
Ituri was ‘plunged into conflict over land distribution and the ownership of natural resources’3 
as a result of the trade in and growing interest in the natural resources found in the district 
(which included gold, petroleum, timer, coltan and diamonds).4 The multi-ethnic Ituri region, 
                                                
a/0053/09, a/0249/09, a/0292/09, a/0398/09 and a/1622/10), ICC-01-01/01-06, V01 team of legal 
representatives, 18 April 2012, para. 12. 
2 Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, Closing Brief of the V02 Group of Victims, ICC-01/04-01/06, Trial 
Chamber I, 1 June 2011.  
3 Idem, para. 16. 
4 Idem, para. 14. 
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which consisted of a majority Hema population and other ethnic groups such as the Lendus, 
had coexisted peacefully before, making a living primarily off of agricultural activities. The 
violence that broke out in 2002 was then taken advantage of by local politicians who sought to 
control these resources and consolidated their power from the income they made through the 
trade in these resources.5 
 
One such politician, Thomas Lubanga Dyilo (Lubanga) formed (and then became the President 
of) the Union des Patriotes Congolais, or the Union of Congolese Patriots (UPC), later renamed 
Union des Patriotes Congolais/Reconciliation et Paix, or the Union of Congolese 
Patriots/Reconciliation and Peace.6 Lubanga established the military wing of his party, the 
Forces Patriotiques pour la Liberation du Congo, or the Patriotic Forces for the Liberation of Congo 
(FPLC) and became its head. In this capacity, from July 2002 to December 2003, Lubanga and 
other members of the FPLC ‘undertook the large-scale enlistment of children under the age of 
fifteen years who were trained in the FPLC training camps […] and who subsequently 
participated actively in hostilities.’7 It must be noted that some Hema child soldiers allegedly 
voluntarily joined the FPLC, though it can be argued that voluntary recruitment of children is 
often not voluntary at all, and that communities even encouraged this voluntary recruitment of 
children8, or were unaware that the recruitment of children into the armed forces was a war 
crime9. International criminal law assumes that those under 15 are not capable of exercising 
their consent when it comes to voluntarily joining armed groups.10 
 
Lubanga was charged and later convicted by the ICC along with his co-perpetrators for 
agreeing to, and participating in, a common plan to build an army, whose purpose was to 
establish and maintain control over the Ituri region. It was because of the implementation of 
this common plan that children under the age of 15 were conscripted into the UPC/FPLC 
between 1 September 2002 and 13 August 2003.11 Lubanga’s role in the UPC and FPLC and 
his awareness of his role, his exercise of authority and implementation of UPLC/FPLC policies 
and plans, including the recruitment of children under the age of 15 and making them 
participate in hostilities, led to the charges and later conviction by the ICC.12 
 
Lubanga was found guilty of the war crime of ‘enlisting and conscripting of children under the 
age of 15 years and using them to participate actively in hostilities’ on 14 March 2012 and was 
sentenced on 10 July 2012 to 14 years’ imprisonment. This verdict and sentence was confirmed 
by the Appeals Chamber two years later, in December 2014.13 
                                                
5 Idem, paras. 18–9. 
6 Idem, para. 19. 
7 Idem, para. 21. 
8 M.A. Drumbl, ‘Unlawful Recruitment and Use of Children: From Proscription to Prevention’, 
Reimagining Child Soldiers in International Law and Policy, 2012, p. 15. 
9 E. Birchall, E. Francq & A. Pijnenburg, ‘The International Criminal Court and Reparations for Child 
Victims of Armed Conflict, Briefing Paper No. 4 (2011)’, at 
http://www.essex.ac.uk/tjn/documents/paper_4_children_in_conflict_large.pdf, (accessed on 18 
March 2017), para. 66. 
10 Drumbl 2012, supra note 9, p. 15. 
11 Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, Case Information Sheet, Situation in the Democratic Republic of 
the Congo, ICC-01/04-01/06 at https://www.icc-
cpi.int/en_menus/icc/situations%20and%20cases/situations/situation%20icc%200104/related%20c
ases/icc%200104%200106/Pages/democratic%20republic%20of%20the%20congo.aspx (accessed on 
18 March 2017). 
12 Closing Brief of the V02 Group of Victims, supra note 3, para. 22. 
13 Case Information Sheet, supra note 12. 
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II. The Right to Reparation and the Protection of Children 
 
This section will examine the rights children are entitled to, and their right to reparations, from 
a theoretical point of view, before examining how these rights were manifested before the ICC 
in the Lubanga case. The right to reparations is recognised in international law. It is enshrined 
in the United Nations Resolution on Basic Principles and Guidelines on the Right to Remedy 
and Reparation for Victims of Gross Violations of International Human Rights Law and 
Serious Violations of International Humanitarian Law.14 The preamble to the Basic Principles 
references the right to a remedy for human rights violations in numerous other international 
instruments.15 As mentioned in the preamble to the Basic Principles, children share this right to 
reparations as protected persons. However, child victims are not a homogenous group and 
should not be seen as such.  
 
Reparations can take the form of individual reparations, or material benefits, and are usually 
focused on repairing the harm sustained by an individual. This can take the form of financial 
compensation or access to services such as health care, education and housing for example. 
Collective or symbolic reparations focus on repairing the damage sustained to a community as 
a whole, and includes memorials and monuments, learning centres and public apologies.   
 
The main guiding document that enshrines the rights of children under international law is the 
Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC). The CRC recognises children as the main 
owners of their rights and acknowledges their ‘distinct legal personality.’16 Two important 
elements of the CRC that warrant focus and provide overarching guidance throughout this 
paper are: the best interests of the child, contained in Article 3(1) of the CRC, and the evolving 
capacities of the child, contained in Articles 5 and 12(1) of the CRC. ‘Working together, these 
principles recognise the continued need for protection as well as the increasing ability to make 
personal decisions as children grow in age and maturity.’17 The CRC also contains no 
derogation clause, and applies during all times, whether during times of peace or conflict.  
 
The definition of a child in the CRC is pegged at the age of 18, although in the case of an armed 
conflict this presents a contradiction since the CRC, in Article 38, allows for states to recruit 
individuals into the armed forces from the age of 15. As the CRC acknowledges, children, by 
                                                
14 The Basic Principles and Guidelines on the Rights to a Remedy and Reparation for Victims of Gross 
Violations of International Human Rights Law and Serious Violations of Humanitarian Law, 
E/CN.4/RES/2005/35 (16 December 2005). 
15 Basic Principles preamble, Article 8 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, Article 2 of the 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Article 6 of the International Convention on the 
Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, Article 14 of the Convention Against Torture and 
Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading treatment or Punishment, and Article 39 of the Convention on the 
Rights of the Child, and of international humanitarian law as found in Article 3 of the Hague 
Convention respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land of 18 October 1907 (Convention IV), 
Article 91 of the Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and relating to the 
Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts (Protocol I) of 8 June 1977, and Articles 68 and 
75 of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court.  
16 Idem, para. 226. 
17 S. M. Miano, ‘Toward a Child-Oriented Approach to Reparations: Reflecting on the Rights and 
Needs of Child Victims of Armed Conflict’, The Fletcher Journal of Human Security XXVIII 2013, at 
http://fletcher.tufts.edu/~/media/Fletcher/Microsites/praxis/xxviii/article2_miano_ChildReparatio
ns.pdf (accessed on 18 March 2017), p. 30. 
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their very nature, require the continued need for protection. Allowing such a low age of 
recruitment to be determined by states ‘fails to take into account the fact that effective protection 
of children from the impact of armed conflict requires an unqualified legal and moral 
commitment, which acknowledges that children have no part in armed conflict.’18 Even where 
children allegedly voluntarily join armed forces, these rights should apply, acknowledging that 
in the best interests of the child, and the evolving capacities of the child, such recruitment could 
not have been completely voluntary. This is demonstrated in the DRC, as it was then 
permissible to recruit children into the armed forces at the age of 15. In the Lubanga case, the 
ICC therefore charged Lubanga with the recruitment of child soldiers under the age of 15, as 
children above the age of 15 could be recruited into the armed forces. This is despite the 
definition of the child being pegged at the age of 18 by the CRC.  
 
The ICC has a reparations mandate as set out by the Rome Statute, which entered into force 
on 1 July 2002.19 The ICC can only make an order for reparations ‘subject to a judgment of 
guilt and the criminal conviction of the accused.’20 Article 75 of the Rome Statute contains the 
obligation for the ICC to establish the principles relating to reparations.21 The Court makes an 
order for reparations against a convicted person, and can, as stated in Article 75(2), order that 
a reparations award be made through the TFV.22 The ICC, following the guidance provided 
in the Basic Principles, can define the concept of reparations as one that ‘goes far beyond the 
notion of financial compensation alone and should include restitution, compensation, 
rehabilitation, satisfaction and guarantees of non-repetition.’23 
 
Reparations are and should rightfully be central to healing. It is important to consider both 
individual and collective reparations, when considering what reparations should be awarded to 
fulfil this central objective. Although the issue of child soldiers had been examined before the 
Special Court for Sierra Leone, the Lubanga case before the ICC was very significant because, 
unlike in Sierra Leone, it was the first time the issue of reparations for former child soldier 
victims had been addressed. The reparations order in Lubanga is therefore significant because 
it will undoubtedly lay a precedent for similar situations in the future.  
 
Reparations implemented in isolation from other transitional justice measures can be counter-
productive. Individual and collective reparations should be implemented together and should 
be undertaken as part of other truth-seeking and transitional justice mechanisms. They are 
‘likely to be less effective if they do not have direct impact on the victims’ situation.’24  
 
Article 15 of the Basic Principles states that reparations should be ‘adequate, effective and 
prompt’ and ‘proportional to the violations and the harm suffered’25. The Basic Principles have 
identified the following forms for reparations; 1) restitution, 2) compensation, 3) rehabilitation, 
4) satisfaction and 5) guarantees of non-repetition. 26 When looking at each of the five forms of 
                                                
18 G. Machel, UN study on the impact of armed conflict on children, New York: United Nations 1996 para. 231. 
19 2002 Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, 2187 UNTS 90, (1998). 
20 Birchall, Francq & Pijnenburg 2011, supra note 10, para. 16. 
21 Rome Statute, supra note 20, art. 75. 
22 Idem, art. 75(2). 
23 Birchall, Francq & Pijnenburg 2011, supra note 10, para. 133. 
24 UNICEF Innocenti Research Centre in cooperation with the International Center for Transitional 
Justice, ‘Children and Truth Commissions’ 2010 at http://www.unicef-
irc.org/publications/pdf/truth_commissions_eng.pdf, p. 52. 
25 Basic Principles, supra note 16, art. 15. 
26 Basic Principles, supra note 16, arts. 19-23. 
 AMSTERDAM LAW FORUM VOL 9:2 70 
reparations, from the lens of child soldier victims, there are several ways to inform reparations 
based on the best interests and evolving capacities of children, and this is examined in the 
paragraphs below. Informing reparations from the perspective of child victims helps to shift the 
narrative from the child being a vulnerable person who is a victim of the circumstances into a 
more resilience-oriented approach. Consulting with children throughout the reparations 
process and shaping a reparations award around their views and considerations also helps to 
acknowledge the agency of children. 
 
The first of the five identified forms of reparations as articulated in the Basic Principles, 
restitution, aims to restore victims back to their circumstances before they faced violations. One 
crucial way for children to have restitution is for them to return to their communities and more 
importantly, to reintegrate back into the community. There are often several difficult stigmas 
associated with returning, especially for girl victims who may have experienced sexual violence. 
Restitution for child victims in armed conflict is also important to ensure that they are not 
recruited into similar situations of armed conflict again. ‘When returning home causes harm or 
contradicts children’s preferences, doing so may not be in their best interest and may not 
facilitate authentic restitution. Whether young people decide to reintegrate into their places of 
origins or to resettle elsewhere, measures of support, such as transitional homes, should be 
provided to help restore them to their original situation.’27  
 
Compensation is the second listed form of reparations in the Basic Principles. While the direct 
economic compensation in the form of cash may seem like the most obvious means of 
reparations, it may not always be in the best interests of the child. Compensation in this form 
could cause strain in communities and among families that do not receive such financial 
compensation. A more effective approach would be to consider the child’s long-term interests. 
This can include education grants and training that would make up for lost opportunities. Such 
measures also have the added value of enhancing the well-being of the community and reducing 
the risk of stigmatisation for the child victims.  
 
In situations of armed conflict, where children have been involved in hostilities and are victims 
of the violence these situations entail, irreparable damage has been done to the ‘relationships 
and social fabric among individuals, communities, societies and cultures.’28 It was therefore 
crucial that the reparations order in the DRC recognised the need to address the healing of 
these relationships and the social fabric.  
 
 
III. Reparations Submissions before the ICC 
 
This section examines the submissions and observations on reparations made by the legal 
representatives of victims, the Office of the Public Counsel for Victims (OPCV), and other 
parties (UNICEF and other non-governmental organisations) before the ICC in the Lubanga 
case. As the legal representatives for the victims who made applications before the ICC, the 
V01 and V02 legal representative teams made submissions to the ICC on the types of 
reparations requested by their clients. The OPCV was given leave to make observations on 
reparations before the Court as it was appointed the legal representative for all the remaining 
unrepresented applicants for reparations. UNICEF and other organisations were similarly 
allowed to make reparations submissions due to their expertise and experience working with 
                                                
27 Idem, p.37. 
28 D. Mazurana & K. Carlson, ‘Children and Reparation: Past Lessons and New Directions,’ Innocenti 
Working Paper 2010-08, p. v. 
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children in conflict situations. These actors were best-placed to represent the victims in the 
reparations deliberation, because of their direct contact with and representation of victims, 
presumably therefore making reparations submissions that have acknowledged the agency of 
children, and are made in their best interests and with their evolving capacities in mind.  
 
 
III.1 Victims and Counsel for Victims Groups 
 
The types of reparations requested by the child soldier victims aimed to reintegrate them into 
society. These requests took the form of grants for education, access to employment 
opportunities and other monetary means to facilitate reintegration. 
 
The Legal Representatives of the V01 group of child soldier victims, in their observations on 
the sentence and reparations, noted that among the views and concerns elicited from their 
relatively small group of clients, these views and concerns were ‘widely divergent. This may be 
partly because these victims do not form a group and are acting individually. On other points, 
however, their views and concerns clearly converge.’29 This highlights the disparity between 
victims as they did not see themselves as a collective group, which influenced their requests for 
individual reparations (which included employment opportunities, microcredit and medical and 
psychological care). The V01 submission noted the difficulties in having collective reparations 
because ‘even though the Ituri community suffered from Lubanga’s crimes, it also supported 
and collaborated with the leaders who engaged in these crimes, such that an award for 
reparations to the whole Hema community would not be reasonable and could be perceived as 
unjust by other communities.’30 However, nine out of twelve of the former child soldiers31 
supported several collective measures such as an outreach campaign and the creation of a 
memorial, to ‘benefit the social group of former child soldiers as a whole without being 
perceived as unjust or encouraging the enlistment of children in future conflicts, in particular 
initiatives that could encourage the reintegration of former child soldiers into society.’32 What 
is commendable is that the victims in the V01 group prioritised, as criteria in determining who 
should receive reparations, girls who had been infected with HIV or had a child as a result of 
rape and those who had been victims of sexual abuse or slavery.33 
 
The Legal Representatives of the V02 group of child soldier victims, in their observations on 
sentencing and reparations, stated clearly their preference for reparations to be awarded 
primarily on an individual basis, ‘because it was the child who suffered personally’34, but also 
that reparations should be considered for all children who were recruited into the armed forces, 
who may not have taken part in the proceedings. Collective reparations were also argued for to 
avoid the impression that child soldiers were being rewarded for their participation in the 
hostilities. The Legal Representatives surmised that, on behalf of their group of victims, the 
                                                
29 Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo Observations on the sentence and reparations by Victims a/0001/06, 
a/0003/06, a/0007/06, a/00049/06, a/0149/07, a/0155/07, a/0156/07, a/0162/07, a/0149/08, 
a/0404/08, a/0405/08, a/0406/08, a/0407/08, a/0409/08 , a/0523/08, a/0610/08, a/0611/08, 
a/0053/09, a/0249/09, a/0292/09, a/0398/09 and a/1622/10, ICC-01-01/01-06, V01 team of legal 
representatives, 18 April 2012, para. 12.  
30 Idem, para. 16. 
31 Idem, paras. 18–9. 
32 Idem, para. 17. 
33 Idem, para. 29. 
34 Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, Observations of the V02 group of victims on sentencing and 
reparations, ICC-01-01/01-06, V02 team of legal representatives, 18 April 2012, para. 16.  
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reparations order should be both individual and collective, and that individual reparations 
should be considered with the aim of restitution and compensation, while collective reparations 
should be considered with the aim of rehabilitating the community.35  
 
While this article does not delve into this issue in detail, it acknowledges the unfortunate 
exclusion of gender-based violence in the crimes for which Lubanga was prosecuted, and the 
Appeal Chamber’s finding that the definition of victims as provided for in rule 85(a) of the Rules 
of Procedure and Evidence did not include those who had suffered harm as a result of the 
commission of crimes within the jurisdiction of the Court. The Appeals Chamber unfortunately 
found that sexual and gender-based violence could not be defined as a ‘harm resulting from the 
crimes for which Mr. Lubanga was convicted.’36 This confirmed the Trial Chamber’s findings 
that there was insufficient evidence to suggest that Lubanga had ordered or encouraged, or was 
even aware of, sexual violence occurring during the conflict. Despite significant evidence of 
sexual exploitation by armed forces, the Trial Chamber had found that it was ‘unable to 
conclude that sexual violence against the children who were recruited was sufficiently 
widespread that it could be characterised as occurring in the ordinary course of the 
implementation of the common plan for which Mr. Lubanga is responsible.’37  
 
However, the Appeals Chamber did find that such victims of sexual and gender-based violence 
should not be precluded from benefitting from the TFV’s assistance activities. The Appeals 
Chamber was of the view ‘that it is appropriate for the Board of Directors of the Trust Fund to 
consider, in its discretion, the possibility of including such victims in the assistance activities 
undertaken according to its mandate under regulation 50(a) of the Regulations of the Trust 
Fund.’38 The Appeals Chamber also suggested that the draft implementation plan should 
include a referral process for victims of sexual and gender-based violence to other NGOs that 
provide appropriate services.  
 
 
III.2 Office of the Public Counsel for Victims 
 
The OPCV provided valuable insight into the reparations that should be ordered for child 
victims in their submission. As the legal representative for any unrepresented applicants before 
the Court, the OPCV received applications for reparations and filed submissions on the 
principles concerning reparations that the Chamber should consider ‘on behalf of those victims 
who have not submitted applications but who may fall within the scope of an order for collective 
reparations’39.  
 
From the outset of the OPCV’s observations, the infeasibility of individual reparations was 
highlighted. Unfortunately, this was based purely on practical considerations, as the OPCV 
observed that the convicted person had no assets which could have been used to support the 
                                                
35 Idem, para. 20. 
36 Idem, para. 196. 
37 Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, Decision on Sentence pursuant to Article 76 of the Statute, ICC-
01/04-01/06, Trial Chamber I, 10 July 2012, para. 74. 
38 Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, Judgment on the appeals against the ‘Decision establishing the 
principles and procedures to be applied to reparations’ of 7 August 2012 with AMENDED order for 
reparations (Annex A) and public annexes 1 and 2, ICC-01/04-01/06 A A 2 A 3, 3, Appeals Chamber, 
3 March 2015, para. 199. 
39 Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, Observations on issues concerning reparations, ICC-01-04/01-06, 
Office for the Public Council for Victims, 18 April 2012, para. 6. 
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reparations award. Another practical consideration given undue cause was the limited resources 
at the TFV’s disposal.40 The OPCV was of the view that a combination of individual and 
collective reparations would be the best solution.  
 
 
III.3 OPCV – Individual Reparations 
 
The OPCV suggested limiting individual reparations to the former child soldiers and their close 
family members. The OPCV advocated for the concept of ‘project of life’ as first developed by 
the Inter-American Court of Human Rights, acknowledging that there is no existing form of 
compensation that could fully repair the harm suffered by child soldier victims. The concept of 
‘project of life’ recognises that each individual has a life plan that allows for the full self-
actualisation of the person and that damage suffered to one’s life plan is irreparable or only 
reparable with great difficulty. Acknowledging that former child soldiers who have suffered 
severe physical injury or psychological trauma may experience a greater disruption to their 
‘project of life’, the OPCV argued that all those who had been recruited at a young age would 
have been ‘deprived of vital aspects of their childhood’ which would impact the quality of their 
‘project of life’ in the future.41 The OPCV also recognised this especially with regard to victims 
of sexual violence who were involved with armed groups.  
 
The Office recommended that the application of the ‘project of life’ concept in the Lubanga 
case should depend on the individual’s specific needs and should include ‘inter alia reintegration 
into society, physical and mental health care, provision of some form of education or vocational 
training and sustainable work opportunities.’42 This is very much in line with what the victims 
had requested. In fact, the OPCV observations went on to say that the Trial Chamber should 
not request any proof of damage to their ‘life plan’ from the victims based on the concept of 
‘project of life’. ‘Indeed, the very fact of conscription of children below the age of fifteen into 
the FPLC between September 2002 and 13 August 2003 constitutes per se sufficient proof of 
damage to the “life plan” of the former child soldiers concerned.’43 This is a very positive 
interpretation as it does not unduly place a heavy burden on child solider victims to prove the 
harm they suffered.  
 
While recommending individual reparations for child soldier victims and their family members, 
the OPCV did not believe that this should come in the form of giving cash compensation to the 
former child soldiers. The OPCV was mindful that this could have negative repercussions and 
would defeat the purpose of giving reparations.  
 
 
III.4 OPCV – Collective Reparations 
 
With regards to collective reparations, the OPCV looked at this from various angles, taking 
several factors into consideration. For instance, non-material damage suffered by child soldier 
victims, non-material damage suffered by the family members of child soldier victims, and the 
compensation of medical expenses and collective reparations in a larger sense. The OPCV did 
note that ‘for the purpose of implementing such collective reparations, some form of individual 
                                                
40 Idem, para. 12. 
41 Idem, para. 54. 
42 Idem, para. 57. 
43 Idem, para. 60. 
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identification and verification process would be required.’44 The OPCV suggested that any 
collective reparations in the Lubanga case should first be directed at the former child soldier 
victims and their relatives and notes that this is in line with the TFV’s rehabilitation mandate. 
Collective reparations should also be considered for a precise community affected by the 
recruitment of children into the armed forces and in such cases, would not need to identify 
individual beneficiaries. Symbolic measures were also considered, including public apologies 
and acknowledgements of responsibility, commemorations and tributes, inclusion of an 
accurate account of violations in training and education and guarantees of non-repetition. 
These measures were also encouraged because they would not entail significant financial 
commitments.45 However the OPCV suggested leaving it up to the TFV to decide on the actual 
design of such a reparations programme.46  
 
While individual reparations are deemed important and necessary for individual victims, they 
are often not feasible due to a lack of financial ability on the defendant’s part and the general 
lack of resources from another implementing body (whether that be a national government or 
the TFV for example). However, as stated above, it is difficult to identify collective reparations 
without some level of individual identification.  
 
The OPCV favoured a collective approach to the reparations award in this case, as the legal 
representative of a significantly large group of victims. While this may have been necessary to 
encompass all or most of the child victims in the Lubanga case, individual applications for 
reparations were not given the full weight that they deserved.  
 
 
III.5 Observations by UNICEF and NGOs 
 
UNICEF was granted leave by the Trial Chamber to make representations in the reparations 
proceedings on 20 April 2012. UNICEF noted their own expertise in the protection of children, 
especially children who had been recruited by armed forces and highlighted their own 
experience in the DRC and in the Ituri district itself, justifiably giving them more local 
knowledge and experience than any other actor during the trial process at the ICC. UNICEF 
submitted that the Court should grant a reparations order that contained both individual and 
collective reparations, based on the overriding consideration of the best interests of the victims 
based on Article 3 of the CRC.  
 
UNICEF noted the importance of individual reparations which ‘highlight the value of each 
human being, and confirm that each is an individual rights-holder, which is particularly 
important for child victims.’47 This did not take away from the importance of collective 
reparations however, and UNICEF did acknowledge the importance of addressing the needs of 
the affected communities to ‘avoid the dilemma of granting reparations only to those victims 
who have been reached and who have had the ability to come forward.’48 UNICEF suggested 
the need for individual reparations to be flexible enough to include rehabilitation measures that 
would benefit the communities at large.  
                                                
44 Idem, para. 84. 
45 Idem, para. 109. 
46 Idem, para. 95. 
47 Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, Submission on the principles to be applied, and the procedure to be 
followed by the Chamber with regard to reparations, ICC-01/04-01/06, United Nations Children’s 
Fund, 10 May 2012, para. 7. 
48 Ibid. 
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Their submission can be summarised as follows: 
 
‘(a) reparations should be designed with the best interests of the victims as a primary 
consideration, recalling that they were children at the time; 
(b) the eligibility for reparations in this case should be assessed as broadly as possible; 
(c) reparations should do no harm and should be applied in a non-discriminatory 
manner; 
(d) in formulating reparations, the local and national contexts should be understood 
and respected and thus the views of the victims, their families and communities 
should be a major consideration in formulating reparations; and (e) reparations 
should be crafted to promote non-repetition of the crimes.’49 
 
This article agrees with UNICEF that individual and collective reparations ‘are not mutually 
exclusive, but rather mutually reinforcing.’50 At least till the Appeal Chamber decision, there 
appeared to be a misunderstanding among many actors before the Court that collective 
reparations would rule out the possibility of individual reparations and that awarding individual 
reparations would not benefit a larger community group who should perhaps rightfully receive 
such benefits.  
 
Whether one considers there to be a hierarchy of reparations, in that individual reparations 
should come first followed by collective reparations, or that individual reparations should be 
conceived broadly enough to benefit the wider community, either approach allows for a broad 
inclusion of victims who would be able to access the benefits from a reparations order. This is 
especially so for those who may not have come forward to make an application for reparations, 
such as women and girls, out of fear or concerns of stigmatisation. It is also here that collective 
reparations have an important role to play because ‘community reparations would mitigate the 
serious risk that non-Hema communities, notably the Lendu community, may perceive 
reparations granted by the Court as a ‘reward’ to Hema children who were associated with 
Lubanga’s armed group.’51 
 
Like UNICEF, the International Centre for Transitional Justice (ICTJ) was also granted leave 
to make representations on reparations before the ICC. The ICTJ, acknowledging the limited 
resources for reparations, felt that ‘the award of reparations in this case should prioritise the 
immediate and direct victims of the crime, i.e. the victims of forced recruitment committed by 
the convicted person, their immediate families and persons who suffered harm as a result of 
intervening to prevent victimisation.’52 This however did not mean that the ICTJ felt the need 
to exclude larger, community-based reparations but considered the importance of giving effect 
to reparations to immediate victims. The ICTJ suggested awarding individual compensation to 
immediate victims, but was also cognisant of the potential dependence on financial 
compensation that victims could develop and the high expectations this could set. However, the 
ICTJ argued that this practical consideration should not ‘reflexively respond to unrealistic 
expectations about individual reparations by either proposing the concept of ‘collective 
reparations’ as a default approach or by proposing the payment of a lump sum of money that 
makes no distinctions among victims’ experience and needs.’53 
                                                
49 Idem, para. 6.  
50 Idem, para. 12. 
51 Idem, para. 36. 
52 Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, Submission on Reparations Issues, ICC-01/04-01/06-2842, 
International Centre for Transitional Justice, 10 May 2012, para. 15. 
53 Idem, para. 18. 
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UNICEF and the ICTJ, along with the legal representatives for both victims’ groups, clearly 
indicated a preference for individual reparations, informed by direct consultations with their 
clients or through their collective experience working with children in armed conflict situations. 
However, no party suggested excluding collective reparations at the expense of individual ones, 
and in fact all highlighted the benefits of having a reparations order that would contain both. 
Giving recognition to the harm suffered by individual victims, they advocated for a hierarchy 
of reparations, with individual reparations as a priority, recognising the impossibility of having 
one form of reparations without the other.   
 
 
IV. Reparations Order in March 2015 
 
On 3 March 2015, the Appeals Chamber of the ICC issued its Judgment on the appeals against 
the ‘Decision establishing the principles and procedures to be applied to reparations’ of 7 August 
2012 with its amended order for reparations. This judgment was very significant because it 
established a reparations regime on the liability of the convicted person and his accountability 
towards victims.  
 
The initial Decision establishing the principles and procedures to be applied to reparations 
issued by the Trial Chamber on 7 August 2012 mostly passed on the application of the 
reparations regime to the Trust Fund for Victims and found that reparations should be awarded 
through the TFV. The Trial Chamber was of the view ‘that the TFV is well placed to determine 
the appropriate forms of reparations and to implement them.’54 The Trial Chamber also did 
not issue a reparations order against Lubanga himself because he was indigent. ‘This approach 
was visibly geared at facilitating swift collective reparation. But it caused disappointment among 
victims and triggered separate appeals by legal representatives of Victims V01 and Victims V02 
who sought express judicial recognition of accountability and harm.’55 
 
The V01 team of legal representatives appealed the Trial Chamber’s decision on the following 
grounds: the Trial Chamber had erred in law first, by dismissing the individual applications for 
reparations without entertaining them and second, by absolving the convicted person from any 
obligation as regards reparations, in violation of Article 75(2) that determines that reparations 
orders should be made against a convicted person.56 The OPCV and the V02 team of legal 
representatives also made a joint appeal against the Trial Chamber’s reparations decision, 
similarly appealing against the Trial Chamber’s dismissal of individual applications for 
reparations without considering their merits and allowing the TFV the ‘unfettered discretion to 
decide whether applicants are to be included in reparations programme.’57 The submission 
                                                
54 Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, Judgment pursuant to Article 74 of the Statute, ICC-01/04-01/06-
2842, Trial Chamber I, 14 March 2012, para. 266. 
55 C. Stahn, ‘Reparative Justice after the Lubanga Appeals Judgment on Principles and Procedures of 
Reparation’, EJIL:Talk! 2015, at http://www.ejiltalk.org/reparative-justice-after-the-lubanga-appeals-
judgment-on-principles-and-procedures-of-reparation (accessed on 18 March 2017). 
56 Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, Appeal against Trial Chamber I’s Decision establishing the principles 
and procedures to be applied to reparation of 7 August 2012, ICC-01/04-01/06, V01 team of legal 
representatives, 3 September 2012, para. 19. 
57 Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, Appeal against Trial Chamber I’s Decision establishing the principles 
and procedures to be applied to reparation of 7 August 2012, ICC-01/04-01/06, V02 team of legal 
representatives, 24 August 2012, para. 11. 
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highlighted that the Trial Chamber had failed to give victims the full effect to their right to 
reparations.  
 
The Chamber’s key findings were, firstly, that an order for reparations under Article 75 of the 
Rome Statute needed to contain, at a minimum, five essential elements. These included 
directing the order for reparations against the convicted person, clearly indicating the convicted 
person’s liability with respect to the reparations awarded and the harm caused to the victims, 
and explain the reasoning behind the type of reparations awarded, whether collective, 
individual or both.58  
 
The Appeal Chamber stated that the convicted person’s liability for reparations had to be 
proportionate to the harm caused, and that only victims who had suffered harm as a result of 
the crimes for which Lubanga was found guilty were eligible for a reparations claim. ‘Where an 
award for reparations is made to the benefit of a community, only members of the community 
meeting the relevant criteria are eligible.’59 
 
The Appeals Chamber also notably recognised the individual liability of an accused person for 
reparations, reversing the Trial Chamber’s decision to not hold Lubanga liable for reparations, 
with the Appeals Chamber stating that the ‘obligation to repair harm arises from the individual 
criminal responsibility for the crimes which caused the harm and, accordingly the person found 
to be criminally responsible for those crimes is the person to be held liable to reparations.’60 The 
Chamber also noted that such individual liability for reparations was consistent with the UN 
Basic Principles. The Appeals Chamber furthermore found that the Trial Chamber had erred 
in considering Lubanga’s indigence as a factor for liability for reparations, and noted that the 
indigence of the convicted person ‘is not an obstacle to imposing liability because the order may 
be implemented when the monitoring of the financial situation of the person sentenced reveals 
that he or she has the means to comply with the order.’61  
 
It is argued that this determination on Article 75 of the Rome Statute was a ‘clear victory for 
victims who sought express judicial acknowledgement of accountability, independently of the 
perpetrator’s indigence. It strengthens the expressivist dimensions of ICC reparations which are 
of key importance, in light of the limited resources of the Trust Fund.’62 By expressly ordering 
reparations against the convicted person, even if ordered through the TFV, these expressivist 
dimensions were strengthened. While several parties to the proceedings, especially the TFV, 
were consistently advocating for reparations to have a wider scope and that they should not be 
limited by the charges in order to reach a broader group of victims, the Appeals Chamber has 
decisively said that the scope of reparations needed to be tied to a conviction.  
 
The Appeals decision clarified several potential misunderstandings on the nature of reparations 
that the Trial Chamber had awarded, with several parties being under the impression that the 
Trial Chamber had awarded both individual and collective reparations. Another potential 
misunderstanding was that individual reparations requests that had been filed pursuant to rule 
                                                
58 Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, Judgment on the appeals against the ‘Decision establishing the 
principles and procedures to be applied to reparations’ of 7 August 2012 with AMENDED order for 
reparations (Annex A) and public annexes 1 and 2, ICC-01/04-01/06 A A 2 A 3, 3, Appeals Chamber, 
3 March 2015, para. 1. 
59 Idem, para. 8. 
60 Idem, para. 99. 
61 Idem, para. 104. 
62 Stahn 2015, supra note 56. 
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94 of the Rules of Procedure and Evidence were to be decided upon by the TFV. The V01 
Legal Representatives of Victims argued that the Trial Chamber ‘violated the right of the 
victims to have their individual requests examined and adjudged by the Trial Chamber when 
it delegated this decision to the ‘unfettered discretion’ of the Trust Fund.’63 The Appeals 
Chamber found that the Trial Chamber awarded reparations only on a collective basis and had 
not made any individual reparations orders, and mentioned the Trial Chamber’s endorsement 
of the TFV’s community-based approach which ‘would be more beneficial and have greater 
utility than individual awards, given the limited funds available and the fact that this approach 
does not require costly and resource-intensive verification procedures.’64 The Appeals Chamber 
noted the uncertainty about the type of reparations that had been awarded by the Trial 
Chamber but also noted that when the decision is read as a whole ‘and particularly in light of 
the Trust Fund’s Observations on Reparations upon which the Impugned Decision is based, 
this reference was not intended to order reparations on both a collective and individual basis.’65  
 
On the transmission of individual reparations applications to the TFV, the Appeals Chamber 
noted that victims made applications for individual or collective reparations without knowing 
what type of reparations would be finally adopted. The Appeals Chamber highlighted the need 
to obtain victims’ consent in seeking their participation in the design of collective reparations, 
in light of the principle identified by the Trial Chamber that reparations are voluntary.  
 
The fifth element of a reparations order under Article 75 is that a reparations order should 
identify the victims who are eligible to benefit from reparations or set out the criteria for their 
eligibility. The Trial Chamber did not identify eligible victims under Article 75, although it did 
identify characteristics of groups of eligible victims.66 The Appeals Chamber recalled that it was 
those who suffered harm as a result of the crimes committed by Lubanga who could claim 
reparations against him. It follows that there needed to be such a causal link between the harm 
suffered by those in that community and the crimes that Lubanga was found guilty of. The 
Appeals Chamber was of the view that broad formulations of reparations as suggested by the 
Trial Chamber could lead to those not meeting the criteria being included in the reparations 
award and ‘considers that the Impugned Decision is erroneous in this respect and must be 
amended to clarify that members of communities are entitled to an award for reparations in so 
far as the harm they suffered meets the criterion of eligibility in relation to the crimes of which 
Mr Lubanga was found guilty.’67 However, the Appeals Chamber still favoured the TFV’s 
approach by considering the possibility of including people in the affected communities even 
where they did not necessarily meet this criteria, because the ‘meaningfulness of reparation 
programmes with respect to a community may depend on inclusion of all its members, 
irrespective of their link with the crimes for which Mr Lubanga was found guilty.’68 
 
It is important for those in the ICC determining a reparations order and its implementation to 
not assume that child victims have the same priorities as adult victims or that child victims share 
‘a uniformity of needs or priorities.’69 Victims in Lubanga sought reparations that would help 
them lead a dignified life and while it is unfortunate that the ICC’s reparations award lost its 
                                                
63 Appeals Chamber judgment, supra note 39, para. 137. 
64 Trial Chamber judgment, supra note 55, para. 274. 
65 Appeals Chamber judgment, supra note 39, para. 141. 
66 Idem, para. 205. 
67 Idem, para. 214. 
68 Idem, para. 215. 
69 Mazurana & Carlson 2010, supra note 29, p. 25. 
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focus on some of these aspects of individual healing for the benefit of community healing, it has 
managed to award a reparations order that places significant emphasis on this. 
 
 
V. Trust Fund Filing on Reparations and Draft Implementation Plan of 3 
November 2015  
 
The Trust Fund submitted its Filing on Reparations and Draft Implementation Plan on 3 
November 2015, following a request for extension from the original deadline in September 
2015. Referencing the Basic Principles and the five forms of reparations, the TFV reiterated in 
its Filing on Reparations the Appeal Chamber’s finding that restitution in a situation of enlisting 
and conscripting child soldiers is unachievable, given their experience and the time that has 
now passed since the crimes occurred. ‘In the view of the Trust Fund it is therefore conceptually 
impossible that any collective form of reparations award could result in restoring the status quo 
ante for all victims in this case.’70  
 
The Trust Fund therefore limited its reparations to collective reparations only, following the 
Appeal Chamber’s decision. This was to include reparative measures such as rehabilitation and 
other types of reparations, including symbolic, preventative and transformative reparations, and 
the provision of medical services as stated by the Appeals Chamber. The Trust Fund noted ‘that 
its experience has convinced it to rely on what it refers to as “integrated reparations 
programming” – organizing the delivery of material support (livelihood), physical and 
psychological rehabilitation as an integrated collective reparations programme.’71 The Trust 
Fund indicated that the Draft Implementation Plan will be implemented over three years from 
the completion of the procurement process.72 The Trust Fund has committed 1 million Euros 
towards the reparations awards in the Lubanga case, following a formal declaration on Lubanga’s 
indigence.73 
 
The Trust Fund distinguished between direct and indirect victims, and stated that ‘the 
beneficiary of reparations must fall within the definition of victim’74. The definition of indirect 
victim was limited to ‘family members of direct victims, persons who attempted to prevent the 
commission of one or more of the conviction crimes, persons who suffered harm when helping 
or intervening on behalf of direct victims, and persons who suffered personal harm as a result 
of the offenses’75 as stated in the Appeals decision. This is a relatively narrow definition of 
indirect victims and therefore allows for reparations to benefit those most affected by the crimes 
Lubanga was convicted of.  
 
The Trust Fund also adopted a low standard of proof for the presumption of psychological harm 
in order to prove causality with the crimes for which Lubanga was convicted. In the best 
interests of the child, this paper agrees with the Trust Fund’s approach to adopt such a 
presumption of psychological harm once a child’s participation in military activities has been 
                                                
70 Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, Filing on Reparations and Draft Implementation Plan, ICC-01/04-
01/06, The Trust Fund for Victims, 3 November 2015, para. 193. 
71 Ibid, para. 212. 
72 Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, Filing on Reparations and Draft Implementation Plan Annex A, 
Draft Implementation Plan for collective reparations to victims, ICC-01/04-01/06-3177, Trust Fund 
for Victims, 3 November 2015, para. 173. 
73 Idem, paras. 174–5.  
74 Idem, para. 6. 
75 Idem, para. 8. 
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established.76 This presumption of harm also extends to indirect victims due to the harm 
suffered by direct victims through their service in the UPC and FPLC. Such a low standard of 
proof is welcomed as it helps to capture the many direct and indirect victims in the reparations 
order that chose not to, or were unable to, file reparations requests.  
 
Concerns were expressed by the Trust Fund about reparations exacerbating existing ethnic 
tensions between the Hema and Lendu communities. As most of those eligible for reparations 
in this case would be predominantly from the Hema ethnic group, it could heighten existing 
ethnic tensions. The Trust Fund noted that the problem is ‘exacerbated when consideration is 
given to the other two Ituri affiliated cases before the Court, the case of the Prosecutor v. Katanga 
and the Prosecutor v. Ntaganda’77 and that Hema could receive more reparations from these other 
two cases while the Lendu will yet again not receive any. While this is a very valid concern, the 
reparations order in the Lubanga case needs to and has addressed the child victims who served 
in the UPC/FPLC. The ethnic considerations, though valid, should not expand the reparations 
order too wide such that it takes away from the direct child victims in this case.  
 
In determining the number of potentially eligible victims, the Trust Fund regrettably admitted 
that despite their best efforts, it was not in a position to assist the Court with identifying a definite 
number of potentially eligible victims, both direct and indirect.78 The TFV, for planning 
purposes, therefore estimated the number of victims based on the information at hand and puts 
this number at 3,000 potentially eligible direct and indirect victims, adding that a final 
determination will be made during the plan’s actual implementation.79 
 
The TFV seems to have conflated several of its assistance activities and reparations. Noting the 
overlap, the TFV did state that the ‘Trust Fund would respectfully like to underline again that 
reparations and assistance are two distinct mandates. By providing these examples under the 
assistance mandate the Trust Fund does not want to indicate that Mr Lubanga’s financial 
liability should be limited to what the Trust Fund deemed the most effective use of its resources 
under the assistance mandate.’80 However, it is quite clear that the draft implementation plan 
has been heavily influenced by the TFV’s existing assistance mandate and its past experience in 
delivering this mandate.  
 
When drafting the implementation plan, the Trust Fund, based on the Appeal Chamber’s 
request, considered the views of those victims who directly participated in the proceedings. 
While the Chamber noted that these views should not take precedence over other victims, it is 
clear that they had a significant role in shaping the reparations plan. It is this author’s opinion 
that it is unfortunate that while the role of those victims who directly participated in the 
proceedings was crucial, their role had also been sacrificed for wider collective considerations 
in the implementation plan that the Trust Fund drafted. Despite practical considerations and 
the sheer number of victims in these situations, collective reparations should not substitute a 




VI. Did Reparations Progress Victims’ Rights or Fail Them?  
                                                
76 Idem, para. 18. 
77 Idem, para. 22. 
78 Idem, para. 26.	
79 Trust Fund Filing on Reparations, supra note 71, para. 253. 
80 Idem, para. 267. 
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By entrusting the entire reparations order to the TFV at the ICC, the Court endorsed the Trust 
Fund’s approach to reparations (a collective, community-based approach)81. The question here 
is whether the ICC had to endorse the TFV’s approach, in light of Lubanga’s individual liability 
and his indigence. Given that UNICEF notes that more than thirty times that number of 
children ‘were released from armed groups in Ituru just one year after the events of the present 
case took place’82, perhaps such an approach was the only available option in order to truly 
reach all child victims who were recruited by Lubanga. The ICC and Trust Fund have tried to 
strike a balance here, by limiting the reparations award to their relatively narrow definition of 
direct and indirect victims.  
 
It is this author’s opinion that in dismissing individual child soldier victims’ applications for 
reparations that were filed before the Court, the ICC failed them. The Trust Fund’s screening 
process during the implementation of the Draft Implementation Plan ‘obviates the need for 
prior submission of applications and justifying documentations by victims’83. Asking individual 
victims to file such reparations claims seems futile if they were never going to be considered on 
such an individual basis. By engaging with child soldier victims throughout the reparations 
process, including through the consultations that shaped the draft implementation plan, the 
ICC has acknowledged their agency in the process. However, disregarding their individual 
views for a pre-determined collective approach undermines this agency. It has been argued that 
expectations should have been set from the start of the whole trial and reparations process that 
while their individual requests could not have been fulfilled, their individual needs and 
experiences could help to shape the larger collective reparations order. ‘The participatory 
process of developing and implementing the collective reparations programme recognizes that 
victims occupy a central role in the process of designing and implementing reparations that are 
meaningful and beneficial to victims.’84 Given the role of the TFV in drafting and implementing 
the reparations order and their leaning towards a predominantly collective-based reparations 
and assistance programme, such a bias was bound to occur and should have been foreseen from 
the start.  
 
Rather than responding to the suffering of individual child soldier victims, the TFV’s  
community-based approach supposes that it was the community that suffered, despite the 
community’s active support of child recruitment during the conflict.85 In being unable to 
separate their mandate to provide assistance to victims from their reparations mandate, the 
TFV may be ‘undermining its ability to acknowledge and remedy individual victims’ 
suffering.’86 The Court and TFV should not collectivise the experience of each victim only 
because they were commonly recruited into the same armed force.  
 
However, the Trust Fund, in their filing on reparations and draft implementation plan, has tried 
to achieve what appears to be a very balanced reparations order in theory. Whether such a 
balance is achieved remains to be seen. The ICC and TFV have acknowledged individual 
criminal responsibility for reparations and this promotes accountability in the transitional justice 
                                                
81 C. Ferstman, ‘The Dilemma of Reparations’, United States Institute of Peace, 14 October 2012, 
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process. The relatively narrow definition of direct and indirect victims manages to encompass 
those who were most affected by the crimes for which Lubanga was convicted. While the 
Lubanga reparations order may not have been able to contain all the express wishes of the 129 
individual victims, although this author argues that this should have been the priority, the draft 
implementation plan was able to include many direct victims of Lubanga’s crimes who did not 
file a reparations claim for one of several reasons, including fear and stigmatisation. The lack of 
consistency in a victim’s testimony was also not considered a reason for their disqualification for 
reparations.87 This acknowledges the trauma that many victims would have suffered and allows 
for their inclusion in obtaining reparations.  
 
The Trust Fund’s ‘thick approach’, in which it does not just take into account human behavior 
but also its context as well, allowed it to address the various dimensions and manifestations of 
harm suffered by the victims in this case.88 In addressing the harm suffered by victims, it allowed 
for the inclusion of sexual and gender based violence as it is not possible to ‘disaggregate the 
harm of sexual and gender based violence from the range of other harms that male and female 
soldiers have experienced as a result of their enlistment, conscription and use under Thomas 
Lubanga.’89 This is a definite success of the Draft Implementation Plan by the Trust Fund as it 
has managed to address the Court’s exclusion of the victims of sexual and gender based violence.  
 
The Trust Fund, recognising the victims’ loss of identity, family, and ties to their community 
through their recruitment in an armed group, and noting the reparations requested by victims 
in initial consultations, has proposed a reparations programme that ‘will promote rehabilitation 
and healing; and will contain provisions for medical and psychological treatment of trauma 
experienced by recruited youth, as well as, offer socio-economic support initiatives.’90 This also 
included group therapy for families affected91 and ‘vocational and accelerated literacy training; 
and improving the capacity of victims to access economic opportunities; conflict resolution and 
gender training for victims and communities, life skills development, gender-sensitive training 
addressing gender-based violence, peace education and promotion of a culture of peace in 
affected communities.’92 The TFV faced numerous considerations from victims and the affected 
communities and had the unenviable task of balancing different needs, while facing financial 
and logistical constraints. However, despite this near impossible task at hand, this paper believes 






This paper has argued that the reparations order did not fully address the needs of the children 
who were the main victims in this case. By ordering collective reparations, victims’ individual 
experiences and needs were not addressed. The agency of child victims was acknowledged in 
their consultations throughout the formulation of the reparations plan, but this was then not 
given due weight when prioritising collective reparations over individual ones. Collective 
reparations also ignored the community’s part in supporting child recruitment during the 
conflict, which was seen as acceptable during the time. However, this paper has also shown that 
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collective reparations were the only sustainable option given the various considerations in this 
case. These considerations include the need to reach the most victims possible despite limited 
resources, although restricted by the Appeals Chamber to those harmed by the crimes using 
child soldiers. There was also a conscious awareness by the various parties involved that the 
reparations order should not exacerbate ethnic tensions. By compensating only individual 
victims, who were mostly Hema child soldiers, there was the very real possibility of exacerbating 
ethnic tensions. The Trust Fund has done an admirable job in drafting a reparations plan that 
includes most of the victims’ requested reparations, with the exception of financial 
compensation. Given the limited resources and finances that the Court has, the Trust Fund has 
still managed to mostly preserve the victims’ wishes despite this. 
 
 
 
